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THREE VIEWS OF THE ACADEMY: LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
TRANSITION 
Barbara Glesner Fines* 
JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: 
RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2013). PP. 272. HARDCOVER $95.00. 
 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2013). 
PP. 320. HARDCOVER $31.95. 
 
ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2013). PP. 258. 
HARDCOVER $90.00. 
This review examines three recent additions to the conversation about the future of 
the legal profession and legal education: James Moliterno’s The American Legal Profes-
sion in Crisis: Resistance and Responses to Change, Deborah Rhode’s Lawyers as Lead-
ers, and Robin West’s Teaching Law: Justice, Politics, and the Demands of Professional-
ism.1 These books are indicative of the increased interest shown in these topics by legal 
scholars and other commentators over the past five years.2  All three authors have much to 
criticize regarding the profession in general and legal education specifically. All three raise 
fascinating questions, with slightly different responses, about the future. Who is “the legal 
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 1. JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO 
CHANGE (2013); DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS (2013); ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, 
POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2013). 
 2. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2015); STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013); DOUGLAS O. LINDER & 
NANCY LEVIT, THE GOOD LAWYER: SEEKING QUALITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2014); DEBORAH 
MARANVILLE, LISA RADTKE BLISS, CAROLYN WILKES KAAS & ANTOINETTE SEDILLO LOPEZ,BUILDING ON 
BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (2015); THOMAS D. MORGAN, 
THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (2015); 
RICHARD SUSSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012). 
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profession” and what is “legal education”? What are the central problems these institutions 
face today? How do we know? What needs to happen to address these problems? After a 
brief review of each book individually, this review will examine the conversation among 
these books on the issues facing legal education in particular. 
I. JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE  
In one sense, the broadest perspective on the profession is that provided by Professor 
James Moliterno in The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Responses 
to Change. The book examines several challenges faced by the American legal profession 
over time to examine the responses of those who regulate the profession. Beginning with 
the “crisis” of immigration in the early twentieth century, the book advances a thesis that, 
regardless of the type of response to challenges to the professional cohesion and market 
position of attorneys, those responses have “always served maintenance of the professional 
status quo,”3 resisting change and acting only in response to changes external to the pro-
fession.4 It argues that “[m]ostly, change that has come has been forced by influences of 
society, culture, technology, economics, and globalization, and not by the profession it-
self.”5 As an overview of the historical tensions and developments in the regulation of 
lawyers, particularly by the American Bar Association (ABA), the book is an excellent 
addition to the literature. 
As examples of challenges to the legal profession, the book examines the entrance 
of immigrants into the profession in the early twentieth century, the anticommunism scare 
of the 1930s to 1950s, the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the litigation boom and loss 
of civility in the 1980s, the emergence of multi-disciplinary practice forms in the 1990s, 
and the combination of globalization, technology, and changes in the economic structure 
of lawyering at the turn of the twenty-first century. In a post-script, the book examines 
challenges to legal education. 
There are many important insights in this historical examination. For example, the 
discussion of the established bar’s resistance to the influx of immigrants—particularly 
Catholic and Jewish immigrants—seeking admission to the practice of law explores how 
both educational requirements and regulation of practice forms operated to exclude these 
new entrants. For example, Moliterno notes that the increased demand that applicants for 
law licensure have a university education operated as a tool to either restrict access to the 
profession or impose conformity of culture.6 Today we find critiques of the “stultifying 
sameness”7 of law schools that one could argue are as much a product of these pressures 
toward conformity as any other cause. Likewise, this chapter notes that “class and ethnic 
                                                 
 3. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 3 
 4. Id. at 216-17. 
 5. Id. at 215. 
 6. Id. at 34-35. 
 7. David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 40 
(2011). 
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hostility”8 lay beneath pressures toward integrated bars, restrictions on advertising and 
contingent fees, and other regulations.9 At the very least, the chapter’s examination of 
these early regulations illuminates two worlds of legal practice that endure today: elite 
attorneys in larger firms representing large organizations, on one hand, and solo and small 
firm attorneys representing individuals and small businesses, on the other.10 
In examining the 1950s era of McCarthyism, and then the civil rights movements of 
the 1960s, Moliterno builds on the theme of a “calm, conservative power,”11 in the ABA. 
This power worked against attorneys on the left in order to preserve a homogeneity in the 
bar and a preservation of control by elites. The ABA used oppressive tactics to discipline 
these attorneys, such as ABA recommendations of loyalty oaths,12 the ABA criticism of 
civil rights activism and “cause lawyering,” and the use of traditional restrictions on solic-
itation.13 These chapters provide a detailed examination of bar opposition to these attor-
neys, generally and with specific examples. 
Throughout these chapters and those that follow, Moliterno focuses his discussion 
on the reaction of the ABA as synonymous with “the profession.” The argument advanced 
goes beyond characterizing the ABA as reactive and conservative and, at times, suggests 
an orchestrated plan to reinforce entrenched power within the bar, no matter the issue. 
Thus, while acknowledging that the ABA did move to institute reforms of legal education 
and professional regulation in light of Watergate, he characterizes these as mere window 
dressing designed as “public relations measures, pure and simple.”14 
Courts, in Moliterno’s history, are occasionally characterized as part of the profes-
sion’s overall conservative efforts to maintain the status quo, as in court contempt judg-
ments against attorneys representing individuals accused of communism,15 and at other 
times as instruments of reform forcing change on the profession, as with the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment decisions restricting states’ regulation of advertising.16 
The central portion of the book examines internal struggles over the public’s per-
ception of a “litigation boom” and the view of some courts and attorneys that there exists 
a “civility crisis.”17 Whether there was too much litigation or attorneys were suddenly less 
professional and civil are empirical questions the book does not attempt to answer, but it 
takes the position that these were crises that lawyers were called to address. 
The single greatest challenge to the author in proving his thesis is the idea that there 
is an “American Legal Profession.”18 The book notes this difficulty in the beginning, ask-
ing: “[W]ho speaks for the legal profession?” However, despite recognizing the diversity 
                                                 
 8. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 37. 
 9. Id. at 35-45. 
 10. JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, URBAN 
LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 7 (2005). 
 11. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 52. 
 12. Id. at 54. 
 13. Id. at 69-71. 
 14. Id. at 107. 
 15. Id. at 56. 
 16. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 63. 
 17. Id. at 108-30 (litigation boom); id. at 131-61 (civility crisis). 
 18. Cf. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 6 (“the idea of an identity that lawyers have in common can be said to be 
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of the profession and the disconnect between the American Bar Association and the prac-
ticing bar as a whole,19 its thesis relies on the theory that the “American Legal Profession” 
has a single voice and direction. Admittedly, of the “two hemispheres” of practice—those 
lawyers who primarily represent business corporations and those who primarily represent 
moderate-income individuals—the percentage of attorneys whose practice is devoted to 
serving corporate interests and wealth has increased over time.20 The book provides excel-
lent examples and details of how tensions in society and in legal practice were resolved by 
political and legal maneuvers. However, its conclusion that “the profession” always reacts 
too late to crisis and chooses to protect itself and the status quo excludes from the very 
definition of the profession the diverse lawyers and judges that engage with these issues. 
Selected prominent voices are sometimes taken as the voice of the profession as a 
whole and singular motives are ascribed to the group. Thus, in discussing both the “litiga-
tion explosion” and the “civility crisis,” Chief Justice Warren Burger’s warning that attor-
neys must “keep the jungle from closing in on us” appears on more than one occasion.21 
The book recognizes that the civility crisis is one that has been a recurring theme in debates 
among lawyers and judges,22 and likely reflected society’s increased competitiveness and 
decline in social connection.23 Yet, at other points, one finds the charge that the movement 
to adopt civility codes by some organized bars and courts was motivated by “the targeting 
of civil rights and other ‘cause lawyers’ who turned their attention to affecting social 
causes with unacceptable zeal.”24 Certainly, vague rules and aspirational creeds can be 
used to silence dissident voices. However, the book is on firmer ground in suggesting more 
complex motivations and broader cultural trends, rather than targeted efforts at specific 
groups. 
The remaining chapters in the book address ongoing challenges to the structure and 
function of attorneys: changes in the delivery of legal services and the specter of multidis-
ciplinary practice breaching attorneys’ monopoly barriers; changes in technology and 
travel dissolving national and international jurisdictional boundaries of practice; and the 
global economic crisis adding fuel to the fires of change. The response of the American 
Bar Association to these challenges provides the best evidence of the book’s overall theme. 
Addressing the 2009 Ethics 20/20 Commission’s efforts, the book concludes that the ef-
forts “succeeded in making as little change as possible”25 and is not optimistic that any 
effort could succeed when undertaken by lawyers alone. 
                                                 
vanishing rapidly”). 
 19. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that in 1960, 68% of attorneys practiced in solo and small firms 
while the ABA leadership was composed of only 8.7% solo practitioners). 
 20. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 110-11 (“almost two-thirds of the legal talent in this country is now focused 
largely on meeting the needs of corporate clients”) (citing JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 10). 
 21. This single quotation is repeated several times in chapters 6 and 7. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 63, 81, 
113, 133. 
 22. Id. at 132. See also ROBERT L. NELSON, DAVID TRUBEK, AND RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, LAWYERS’ 
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 178 (1992) (“la-
ments about declining professionalism have been a staple of bar association rhetoric over a long period”). 
 23. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 142. 
 24. Id. at 132. 
 25. Id. at 206. 
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The prescription for change advanced by the author is to look to non-lawyers such 
as technologists, global strategists, and business entrepreneurs, on the grounds that the 
conservative, risk-averse, backward-looking nature of legal thinking will not permit law-
yers to be nimble enough in the fast changing economy to meet the “real crisis” it now 
faces. Thus, the author calls upon lawyers to cede more authority to non-lawyers to shape 
their future: 
 
I recommend a more forward-looking approach, one that welcomes the 
views and even control of non-lawyers, innovators in business, and other 
enterprises. My hope is that the legal profession going forward can be 
more like Apple and IBM and Western Union, and less like Kodak.26 
 
Lawyers are urged to be more like Western Union, remaking business practices to 
deliver the essential mission.27 Unfortunately, the book does not suggest exactly what the 
legal profession’s essential mission is but it does suggest that non-lawyers are necessary 
to help find it. The book provides the examples of law firms using non-lawyers to manage 
their firms, but it does not fully address the extent to which lawyers are competing more 
freely than ever with non-lawyers for the delivery of legal services. The book suggests that 
the expansion of accounting firms in providing corporate legal services was stopped only 
by the Enron scandal and legislative regulation, and that the legal profession “changed 
nothing.”28 However, it is unclear what change the author believes would be necessary or 
appropriate. Moreover, by focusing on corporate legal services, the author overlooks the 
still-growing exodus of clients away from lawyers for many other legal services: state li-
                                                 
 26.  Id. at 215. 
 27. Similar sentiments are expressed in MORGAN, supra note 2, at 127-28: 
 
The A.B.A. Committee on Research About the Future of the Legal Profession offered a 
similar insight when it cited management expert Peter Drucker as blaming the Penn Cen-
tral bankruptcy on the railroad’s’ acting as if it had said, “We have a train. Would you like 
to get on?” instead of “We are in the transportation business. Where would you like to 
go?” The Committee continued, “And so it is for the legal profession and the organized 
bar. We must first get the question right. . . . Do we have a train that can only go where 
the tracks go, or do we provide a form of transportation with the destination to be deter-
mined by our passengers? 
 28. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 174-75. 
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censure of non-lawyers to provide routine services and the proliferation of pro se litiga-
tion29 and non-lawyer representation in administrative proceedings30 or alternative dispute 
resolution.31 
The prescription for reform suggested by the book is to involve non-lawyers in the 
regulation of legal services. The author argues that “sharing power is the greatest need of 
the legal profession going forward: creative non-lawyers are needed to help manage the 
regulation of the legal profession and the justice system.”32 Moreover, Moliterno suggests 
that non-lawyers should be intimately involved in the development of new forms of law 
practice and their regulation. He argues that these non-lawyers are better equipped with 
“abilities and temperaments conducive to forward-looking planning”33 than are lawyers: 
 
The unwelcome cure is to enlist non-lawyers in the regulation of the legal 
profession: planners and evaluators of cultural trends. The profession needs 
people who can participate in lawyer regulation without the self-interest of 
the established members of the bar, people who have a wider view, people 
who can see the path ahead and not merely the ground already trod.34 
 
There is little in these recommendations that urges caution on this road. That non-lawyers 
have much to contribute to remaking and regulating the market for the delivery legal ser-
vices is undoubtedly true. But it is equally likely that these non-lawyers are not immune 
to self-interest. There is nothing to suggest that these non-lawyers would fare any better 
                                                 
 29. In litigation, self-representation is increasingly common especially in fields such as family law, where 
some studies have indicated that “eighty percent or more of family law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.” 
Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Me-
diators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2047 (1999). According to an ABA white paper on pro se 
representation, self representation in the United States has grown exponentially. 
 
When going to state court, most people proceed pro se most of the time. High volume state courts, 
including traffic, housing and small claims, are dominated by pro se litigants. Over the course of 
the past 20 years, domestic relations courts in many jurisdictions have shifted from those where 
litigants were predominately represented by lawyers to those where pro se’s are most common. In 
these areas of the courts, pro se is no longer a matter of growth, but rather a status at a saturated 
level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that pro se representation is increasing in other personal civil 
matters, as well. In California, Arizona and Florida, independent paralegals (also called Legal Doc-
ument Assistants) are authorized to help people prepare a range of forms needed to handle certain 
legal matters pro se. 
ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS 
TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 4 (2005) http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/de-
livery/downloads/prose_white_paper.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 30. Barbara Allison Clayton,  Comment, Are We Our Brother’s Keepers? A Discussion of Nonlawyer Rep-
resentation Before Texas Administrative Agencies and Recommendations for the Future, 8 TEX. TECH ADMIN. 
L.J. 115, 122 (2007). 
 31. “Despite much discussion on the subject, there is still some controversy within the legal community over 
whether the practice of mediation constitutes the practice of law.” Fiona Furlan et al., Ethical Guidelines for 
Attorney-Mediators: Are Attorneys Bound by Ethical Codes for Lawyers When Acting As Mediators?, 14 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 267, 273 (1997). 
 32. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 177. 
 33. Id. at 222. 
 34. Id. at 224. 
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than “the profession” has in valuing diversity, access to justice, and rule of law.35 These 
are not reasons to exclude, but they are reasons to proceed with some of the caution that 
the author criticizes as too representative of the legal profession. And perhaps these are 
reasons to reconsider the vision of the attorney and capture some of the leadership abilities 
that Moliterno’s book finds so lacking in the profession. 
II. DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 
In Deborah L. Rhode’s book, Lawyers as Leaders, we again find the profession fall-
ing short. Lawyers frequently find themselves in positions of leadership, but the book 
questions their capabilities in that role, suggesting that a “mismatch between the traits 
associated with leaders and those associated with lawyers” could be the root of the prob-
lem.36 While she notes that “the legal profession attracts a large number of individuals with 
the ambition and analytic capabilities to be leaders[,]” she finds that that same profession 
“frequently fails to develop other qualities that are essential to effectiveness.”37 In partic-
ular, she relies on the research into general lawyer traits compared to the skills required of 
leaders. So, for example, while leaders must provide vision, lawyers have a tendency to be 
“cynical and judgmental;” lawyers must have well developed interpersonal skills, yet the 
tendency of attorneys to “[u]rgency . . . can lead to impatience, intolerance, and a failure 
to listen.”38 Likewise, leaders must have strong skills in “self awareness, self-control, and 
self-direction;” yet, “[c]ompetitiveness and desires for autonomy and achievement can 
make lawyers self-absorbed, controlling, combative, and difficult to manage.”39 
Rather than simply noting the difficulties, this book offers help: first, by providing 
an overview of leadership traits, styles, and development, especially with regard to ethical 
leadership; and then by focusing on leadership as it addresses specific topics such as di-
versity and social reform. Like all of Professor Rhode’s scholarship, the book represents a 
comprehensive review of the applicable literature40 and also includes engaging anecdotes 
that help to illustrate her points, including some personal stories that illuminate her passion 
for her thesis.41 This combination makes the book engaging and informative for a broad 
range of readers. 
The first five chapters of the book summarize leadership theory. This effort alone is 
an impressive task. As the book itself notes, “leadership development is now a forty-five 
billion dollar industry” with “close to 88,000 leadership books in print”42 and “over 1,500 
                                                 
 35. Cf. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 209, 209 (2003) (“Political partisans do not care about impartial justice. They care about rewarding 
their friends and defeating their enemies, and that means ensuring that their enemies receive as little money as 
possible, including money to pay for legal advocacy.”). 
 36. RHODE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. The text includes seventy-eight pages of endnotes. Id. at 209-87. 
 41. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 1, at 22-23 (talking about mentoring experience in a law firm during her 
second year of law school); id. at 23 (relating a story about Thurgood Marshall from her clerkship). 
 42. RHODE, supra note 1, at 1. 
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definitions and forty distinctive theories.”43 In the opening chapters of the book, Rhode 
distills this literature to provide a basic primer for leadership, noting the challenges of 
applying these principles to the practice of law. The book begins by noting the importance 
of context. Several features of today’s practice of law create challenges for effective lead-
ership, including the increased competition in the delivery of legal services; the complex-
ity, scale, pace, and diversity of the practice; and the culture of a profession which “fail[s] 
to value or to institutionalize shared leadership.”44 
Drawing on Harvard professor Daniel Goldman’s research, the book then summa-
rizes six forms of leadership styles or abilities that are most required of leaders. These 
leadership styles are the ability to coerce compliance, mobilize people toward a vision, 
create community, build consensus, set high expectations, and develop competency and 
leadership in others.45 Of these, the last, called the coaching style, is “the least common 
leadership approach” among lawyers because they “don’t have the time in this high-pres-
sure economy for the slow and tedious work of teaching people and helping them grow.”46 
A point made repeatedly throughout Lawyers as Leaders is the need for self-
knowledge and openness to growth. Here again, we find the nature of a lawyer’s skills and 
training painted as a detriment to leadership.47 Just as Moliterno suggests that the profes-
sion as an entity responds to challenge with defensiveness, Rhode suggests that individu-
ally attorneys are not open to criticism and feedback, which are essential characteristics 
for growth in leadership skills. The high need for approval that is characteristic of many 
attorneys can skew leadership toward only those skills that provide immediate external 
validation. Finally, the book notes that attorneys “tend toward skepticism and emphasis on 
analytic rather than interpersonal skills[,]” which once again can cause attorneys to over-
look the value of reflective practice and self-knowledge.48 
The book’s chapter on specific leadership capabilities (decision-making, influence, 
fostering innovation and managing change, conflict management, and communication)49 
would itself make an effective tool for law school leadership education. Many of these 
skills are familiar to any lawyer, whether acting as a “leader,” or simply as an advocate or 
decision-maker. For example, the discussion of decision-making processes, including the 
current research on cognitive bias,50 has become an increasingly important tool for ana-
lyzing law and teaching law students.51 Likewise, the discussion of “influence” as a lead-
                                                 
 43. Id. at 7. 
 44. Id. at 11. 
 45. Id. at 12-13 (referred to as Coercive, Authoritative, Affiliative, Democratic, Pacesetting, and Coaching 
styles). 
 46. Id. at 21 (quoting Daniel Goleman, Leadership That Gets Results, HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 87 (Mar.-Apr. 
2000)). 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 11-12, 27-28. See also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical 
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1348, 1390-91, 1421 
(1997) (stating that competitiveness and achievement orientation of lawyers undermines professionalism). 
 48. RHODE, supra note 1, at 28-30 (discussing the importance of self-reflection). 
 49. Id. at 40-81. 
 50. Id. at 41-45. 
 51. A Westlaw search of “cognitive bias” provides citations to over 1000 law review articles in the past three 
years alone. 
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ership skill fits with traditional conceptions of core lawyer skills in advocacy and negoti-
ation. Here again, the book turns to cognitive science to unpack these skills into more 
discrete components such as position, reciprocity, social influence, and association.52 Like-
wise, conflict management and approaches to conflict resolution,53 which the book dis-
cusses, have been required reading in alternative dispute resolution curriculum of law 
schools.54 Finally, the skill given the most attention in this portion of the book is public 
speaking.55 This is an interesting selection of communication skill and one which reflects 
some of the book’s bias toward examining high-profile leadership of large groups, rather 
than leadership within smaller institutions, where a primer on listening and interpersonal 
communication would likely be more critical.56 
Other leadership skills are less familiar to the standard repertoire of lawyer skills. 
For example, the ability to foster innovation and change only recently became common 
fare in the menu of legal education. Law schools with courses in entrepreneurship57 are as 
unlikely as courses in leadership.58 Here again the book relies on studies of lawyer person-
alities to explain this deficiency in training, noting that “lawyers as a group tend to be 
particularly resistant to change.”59 Here, Rhode cites Moliterno’s work in criticizing the 
reluctance of the ABA to embrace change in regulatory structures and involvement of non-
lawyers in that process.60 
The final portion of the book’s “how to” section on leadership addresses ethics and 
leadership. Here of course Rhode is on her most familiar territory, having led the charge 
for decades to improve professional responsibility education in law schools61 and pro bono 
service62 in the profession. In working through the four characteristics of personal ethics 
                                                 
 52. RHODE, supra note 1, at 50-56. 
 53. Id. at 61-66. 
 54. Since 2000, the number of alternative dispute resolution courses and faculty devoted to this field has 
dramatically increased in law school. See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of 
the Future of ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 25, 42 (2010) (noting that 342 faculty self-identified as teaching dispute resolution courses in the 2007-
2008 AALS Directory of Law Teachers); John Lande, Reforming Legal Education to Prepare Law Students 
Optimally for Real-World Practice, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2013) (noting that at least seventeen law schools 
require all students to have some instruction in dispute resolution). 
 55. RHODE, supra note 1, at 67-80. 
 56. The section would be helpful reading for classroom law teachers, however, whose effectiveness depends 
on the ability to communicate ideas that “stick.” From this perspective, the book’s observation that the audience’s 
perception of the effectiveness of a speaker is not necessarily correlated to the extent to which the speaker’s 
message is actually retained by the listeners. Id. at 67-68. 
 57. Jaia Thomas, Why Every Law School Should Teach Entrepreneurship, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, Apr. 15, 
2015, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/244925. See also Law School Curriculum Introduction, EWING 
MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., http://www.entrepreneurship.org/Entrepreneurship-Law/Topic-Introduc-
tions/Law-School-Curriculum-Introduction.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (providing examples of law school 
entrepreneurship curriculum). 
 58. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Rethinking the Problem, Reimagining the Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. 
REV. 449 (2013) (“Many law schools’ mission statements include fostering leadership, but only two of these 
schools actually offer a leadership course.”) (citing Neil W. Hamilton, Ethical Leadership in Professional Life, 
6 ST. THOMAS L.J. 358, 370 (2009)). 
 59. RHODE, supra note 1, at 56. 
 60. Id. at 60. 
 61. See generally DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 
(1998). 
 62. See generally DEBORAH RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE 
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identified by psychologist James Rest,63 the book emphasizes the moral failures of lawyer-
leaders to illuminate situations in which “individual self-interests, cognitive biases, and 
organizational dynamics can often trump moral concerns.”64 A series of illustrations of 
lawyers and leaders undertaking unethical behavior follows, with a focused case study on 
Watergate. 
The remaining chapters in the book tie together these general overviews of leader-
ship principles by examining leadership in particular contexts. Each of these include sto-
ries and interviews with attorneys who exemplified success or failure. This is one of the 
most impressive parts of the book, with well over one hundred different attorneys provided 
as examples of some aspect of leadership. In most chapters, the attorneys selected tend to 
be national governmental leaders (presidents, attorneys general, and Supreme Court jus-
tices). Bill and Hillary Clinton, John and Robert Kennedy, Barack Obama, Thurgood Mar-
shall, Sandra Day O’Conner, and Mitt Romney are the most often cited contemporary ex-
amples. Among private attorneys, civil rights leaders, such as William Kunstler or Ralph 
Nader, are given special attention. Nonetheless, examples of lesser-known historical and 
contemporary attorneys in leadership positions in law firms, bar associations, or pro bono 
efforts also appear, especially in the chapters on diversity and leadership in law firms. 
At times, the book tends to overemphasize leadership failure rather than success. 
This focus on failure sometimes leaves the reader hungry for the contrast of effective lead-
ership stories. This focus on failures is most pronounced in the chapters on scandals and, 
to a lesser extent, in the chapter on law firm leadership. While one can imagine the allure 
of cautionary tales in a book focused on leaders, the effectiveness of negative examples is 
questionable. The tendency of leaders, as noted by the book, “to see themselves as unique 
and invulnerable” might make it unlikely that they would recognize themselves in the mis-
takes of others.65 Details of public scandal or law firm collapse and the psychological and 
organizations conditions that led to these failures are presumably meant to help leaders 
avoid similar circumstances. Especially in the chapter on scandals, advice for leaders 
amounts to general cautions or aphorisms with few details or examples.66 Law firm leaders 
are provided more elaboration on structures of accountability, mentoring, strategic plan-
ning, and support for pro bono practice. 
The strongest chapters are those on diversity67 and leadership for social change.68 
Both are replete with examples of lawyers who have been successful, despite the chal-
lenges of bias and discrimination they or their clients faced. Here, one finds examples of 
successful attorneys in leadership positions in firms along with concrete suggestions and 
                                                 
PROFESSION (2005); DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
 63. These are: “moral awareness” (recognizing an ethical issue), “moral reasoning” (determining how to re-
spond), “moral intent” (prioritizing values), and “moral behavior” (acting on these decisions). RHODE, supra note 
1, at 84-85 (citing JAMES R. REST, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 36-49 
(1994)). 
 64. Id. at 84. 
 65. Id. at 116. 
 66. For example, the suggestions for avoiding distortions of money that are the source of much scandal, the 
advice provided is to “keep your life simple, guard against greed, and remember what really matters . . . sweat 
the small stuff.” Id. at 120. 
 67. Id. at 129-54. 
 68. RHODE, supra note 1, at 176-202. 
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examples for how women and minorities (and leaders who seek to promote diversity) can 
achieve work/life balance, resist oppressive structures and stereotypes, and develop resil-
ience where these efforts are unsuccessful. 
In the chapter on leadership for social change, the book recognizes that leaders are 
only one factor in the conditions that influence social change. Accordingly, the book sug-
gests that leaders must be able to capitalize on conditions for progress, whether those con-
ditions are evolutionary changes in society and the economy or one-time events and crises 
that create forces favoring change. Of particular challenge to leaders of social movements 
is the diffuse authority of these groups. A leader rarely has the position and authority to 
direct, but must have the ability to “inspire followers, enlist allies, attract public support, 
and reinforce shared identities” in order to build an infrastructure through which to exer-
cise their leadership.69 
As with the chapter on diversity, the chapter on leadership provides many positive 
role models for effective leadership. Three case studies—the civil rights movement, the 
implementation of Brown v. Board of Education, and the gay marriage movement—pro-
vide concrete examples of many of the principles developed throughout the first half of 
the book. As with the chapter on diversity, many of these suggestions are generalizable to 
any attorney seeking leadership roles.70 
This final chapter on leadership for social change is also a fascinating contrast with 
Moliterno’s book. Where Moliterno views attorneys who work for social change as “out-
side” a profession that has resisted and even actively opposed their efforts, Rhode paints a 
picture from inside the world of these lawyer-leaders. Moliterno characterizes the profes-
sion as acting in “service of the status quo,”71 while Rhode suggests that “lawyers play a 
critical role in cultural transformation.”72 
III. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE 
DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM  
Robin West’s book, Teaching Law: Justice, Politics, and the Demands of Profes-
sionalism, focuses exclusively on this issue of legal education’s response to its current 
challenges. The book is tightly woven and researched, written for a narrower audience of 
those with the particular interest in reforming legal education, with a clear prescription for 
that reform. The book argues that the mission of legal education should be to serve ideals 
of justice−a mission lost in the discussion of the problems and solutions for the current 
crisis. 
The book begins with a summary of the crises facing legal education: an economic 
crisis with rising costs and declining applications and support; a professionalism crisis in 
which the value of a law degree and legal scholarship are increasingly questioned; and an 
existential crisis in which law schools are uncertain of their very identity and mission. 
                                                 
 69. Id. at 206. 
 70. Id. at 176-202. 
 71. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 5, 17, 35, 216. 
 72. RHODE, supra note 1, at 176. 
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West argues that “law schools offer an education designed for a dysfunctional and profes-
sionally stunted conception of what it means to be a lawyer.”73 
In addressing the question of legal education’s identity, the book begins by noting 
the split personality of law schools as colleges in a university and as members of a profes-
sion. The book’s three major chapters examine three manifestations of this confusion. 
First, the values or ideals of legal education are unclear. The book suggests that law 
schools should place not only the search for truth but also the construction of a just society 
as central to teaching and scholarship.74 Second, law schools should include more fully in 
their research and teaching the study of “the cause of law’s existence−in a word, poli-
tics.”75 Third, law schools should study the profession itself.76 The historical roots of these 
three manifestations are developed clearly and persuasively. 
In exploring the values of legal education, the first chapter begins by disclaiming the 
argument that law schools produce “amoral technicians.” Rather, the book notes that law 
schools, through the process of case analysis and reasoning from precedent, engage in a 
powerful acculturation into a set of values that may be summarized by the term “legal-
ism.”77 The precepts of that value system are procedural fairness and formal equality. 
Moreover, law schools do not teach students to accept law without critique, but restrict the 
terms of that critique through the lens of either fairness (measured by formal equality) or 
efficiency. What is missing, the book argues, is the critique of the social, corrective, or 
distributive justice of the legal principles being applied.78 Quite simply, laws can be ap-
plied evenly and efficiently, but can still be unjust. 
Part of the reason for this decline in examination of the basic justice of laws can be 
found in the law itself−the decline in equity as a source of law; the transformation of torts 
from fault to efficiency; and the shift in procedural processes to private rather than public 
process. However, the chapter argues that the structure of legalism itself leaves little room 
for discussions of justice, crowded out by the “purported autonomy and completeness of 
law.”79 The dominance of formalist and realist legal philosophies further explains the firm 
place of legalism in law schools. While noting that the differences between these two ju-
risprudential schools were significant, the chapter explains that it was their shared under-
standings that cemented a legalist value structure that left little room for discussion of 
justice. Langdellian formalism created law schools that were within universities but apart 
from them−where the study of the law itself in judicial opinions was the road to a learned 
profession without detours through philosophy or science or art. Realists, while rejecting 
a vision of law as a source for direction, equally rejected the humanities, creating instead 
critiques from social sciences (statistics, anthropology, sociology, and economics). Both 
focused almost exclusively on the courts as a source of law.80 
                                                 
 73. WEST, supra note 1, at 24. 
 74. Id. at 25. 
 75. Id. at 27. 
 76. See id. at 55. 
 77. Id. 
 78. WEST, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
 79. Id. at 67. 
   80. Id. at 70-82. 
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The absence of theories or discussion of justice in law school scholarship and teach-
ing, West contends, impoverishes both. Students and scholars are left with only internal 
measures that permit critique of a law through reference to its congruence with other law 
or external measures that provide only a cost/benefit analysis of law. Chapter one con-
cludes by suggesting two simple steps to incorporate justice into the classroom—first, fac-
ulty simply welcome discussions of students’ intuitions of justice and second, require a 
formal course on the subject of justice.81 
In chapter two, the book examines legal education’s second identity challenge: the 
creation of law through political rather than judicial processes. The chapter begins with a 
description of the first year of law school, in which a common law process predominates. 
Unfortunately, the description provides no empirical base to support its accuracy. The 
chapter describes the standard first year curriculum as torts, property, and contracts law, 
which is indeed a part of the picture surveys of curriculum paint.82 But the chapter goes on 
to describe how these courses are taught without any explanation of how the author knows 
this to be true. It may very well be that the first year of law school “contains almost no 
statutory law,” and that even in Contracts classes, the Uniform Commercial Code is refer-
enced only “in a glancing way.”83 However, these statements do not reflect my own expe-
rience in the first year, over thirty years ago,84 and it has not been the experience of most 
of the first-year students in the law school where I teach today.85 Moreover, the description 
entirely omits mention of the first-year legal research and writing classes, which are now 
part of the “standard law school curriculum” in the first year, in part because of ABA 
mandates,86 In these research and writing classes, in about half of the law schools, legisla-
tive history and administrative regulations are the subject of instruction.87 The chapter goes 
on to explain the even greater absence of the study of legislative process in the first year, 
comparing this to the training in civil court procedure.88 
In explaining the reasons for this “juriscentric” approach to legal education, the 
chapter posits three reasons: the influence of jurisprudence, constitutionalism, and popular 
culture. The chapter first returns to an examination of the debates of the formalists and 
realists in shaping today’s curriculum, noting that both focus on case law to the exclusion 
of legislation, though for quite different reasons. The chapter then turns to constitutional 
                                                 
 81. Id. at 91. 
 82. CATHERINE CARPENTER, SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 2002-2010 (2012). 
 83. WEST, supra note 1, at 96. 
 84. See generally Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 
461, 461 (1985). I was taught Contracts at the University of Wisconsin-Madison with materials developed by 
“the Gang of Eight” led by Stuart MacCauley. In addition to a sociological introduction to law, the course pro-
ceeded through a disciplined and thorough study of the Uniform Commercial Code’s remedies provisions. Ad-
mittedly, the Wisconsin experience was meant to be different, but the lack of any systematic study of teaching in 
the first year of law school makes these claims difficult to establish. 
 85. At the University of Missouri-Kansas City, Contracts is a six-hour, two-semester course precisely because 
it provides instruction in statutory reading and interpretation. Federal Income Tax was, for many years, also part 
of the required first-year curriculum but was moved to the third semester. 
 86. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCH., 303(a)(2) (2015-16), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html. 
 87. Ass’n of Legal Writing Directors Legal Writing Inst., Report of the Annual Legal Writing Survey (2014), 
at 13, http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-Survey-Report-Final.pdf. 
 88. WEST, supra note 1, at 96-97. 
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law theory as central to our focus on judicial opinions. The primacy of the Supreme Court 
in interpreting the Constitution creates “a form of authority not only divorced from poli-
tics, and higher than politics, but also as fundamentally opposed to politics, and to politics’ 
product, and with a raison d’être entirely devoted to imposing limits upon, rather than 
facilitating, political will.”89 This constitutionalism translates into the required curriculum, 
the chapter argues, by further elevating case law as the law. One might extend the argu-
ment further by noting the higher status of constitutional law scholarship in the academy 
than, say, estates and trusts or family law.90 A final reason proffered for the primary focus 
on case law in the curriculum is the public view of political and processes in popular cul-
ture, where, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington91 notwithstanding, individuals who use polit-
ical processes are painted in a much less admirable light than those who seek to reform 
society through the use of courts. 
The chapter suggests that as a consequence of the academy’s eschewing legislation 
and legislative process, legal education: 
 
truncates our own and our students critical capacities; it wrongly limits 
our understanding of our own constitutional tradition and even stunts our 
reading of its plain text; it muddles our understanding of and our peda-
gogy regarding the origin of law in politics; it limits our students’ edu-
cational attainment and perhaps even their professional careers; and per-
haps most important, it alienates us from the possibility of systematically 
viewing law as an agent of change, rather than an agent of preservation.92 
 
This is a powerful critique and the author advances each of these arguments with a 
carefully constructed logic. The effect on student and scholarly criticism of the law, the 
chapter suggests, is to confine criticism to the law that is, rather than to suggest that the 
absence of law is a problem and to confine the strongest criticism to that which can be 
grounded in the Constitution.93 This type of constitutional interpretation creates a set of 
“negative rights”—restraints on legislation—that limits the ability to conceive and ad-
vance positive rights. Finally, by ignoring legislation and the political process that pro-
duces it, our scholarship and teaching disempower our students, our scholarship, and our 
ability to seek justice through the law as a whole. 
The “bifurcated faculty” of the academy is the focus of the third chapter, which di-
vides the faculty into two competing groups: those whose work closely aligns with the 
                                                 
 89. Id. at 110. 
 90. See, e.g., CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 232 (1981) (family law suffers “prestige depriva-
tion”). And now, I will commit the sin of which I accuse the author, forwarding a proposition about the nature 
of the academy without empirical support. I would offer as some evidence the fact that these areas of law are not 
ranked by any organization or blogger; that there are fewer chaired professorships devoted to these topics; and 
that the same observation has been made by others in the legal academy. 
 91. MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1936) (depicts the experience of a novice legis-
lator (Jimmy Stewart) whose naïve belief in the democratic process upsets the routine of the Congress to achieve 
noble goals). On reflection, perhaps the movie is yet another example of the author’s point. 
 92. WEST, supra note 1, at 114. 
 93. Id. at 116-17. 
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profession (designated “clinical faculty” in this chapter) and those whose scholarship and 
teaching is distanced from the profession (interdisciplinary and doctrinal faculty).94 Here 
again, the empirical basis for the observations about the makeup of faculty in law schools 
is not evident. 
For example, when discussing hiring practices, the chapter posits that “the faculty 
member with no experience at all in the practice of law is increasingly the norm.”95 It 
suggests that the classroom teacher/scholar is increasingly an individual with a Ph.D. 
whose primary identification is with a discipline other than law. It then argues that the 
increased number of clinical and experiential courses (and thus teachers) leaves the acad-
emy with a bifurcation—on the one side, interdisciplinary classroom faculty/scholars, and 
on the other, a professionally oriented clinical faculty—with traditional doctrinal scholars 
and teachers being squeezed out. It would be interesting to see the degree to which this 
intuition about the makeup of law faculties is born out by the numbers.96 
The chapter seems to imply that clinical faculty stand on one side of a divide with 
scholarship on the other. Certainly, we know that across the country the number of adjunct 
faculty—drawn primarily from the practicing bar—is substantial,97 and these faculty do 
not ordinarily produce scholarship. In the classroom, however, these faculty are very likely 
to retain the “traditional doctrinal” approach to teaching that the chapter suggests is being 
squeezed out by experiential learning on the one hand and interdisciplinary teaching on 
the other. Moreover, a significant percentage of full-time clinical faculty do produce schol-
arship, much of it connecting legal education to the practice of law and visions of law and 
lawyering that the chapter asserts is missing from current scholarship.98 The book argues 
                                                 
 94. Id. at 148-49. 
 95. Id. at 151. 
 96. Evidence is not readily available. What percentage of faculty have Ph.D.s? Are these Ph.D.s in fact ad-
vanced law degrees (Ph.D.s in law or JSDs)? A number of law schools now offer Ph.D.s in law. Yale Law School, 
which produces as much as ten percent of the current faculty in law teaching, has recently introduced a Ph.D. in 
law, citing the increasing number of prospective law teachers who are obtaining Ph.D.s in other disciplines. The 
question remains whether having a Ph.D. in another discipline necessarily implies a lack of practice experience 
or even a primary identification with that other discipline. Yale Law School, Yale Law School Introduces Inno-
vative New Program—Ph.D. in Law (2012) http://www.law.yale.edu/news/15782.htm. 
 97. Even as long ago as 1997, adjunct faculty taught as much as “20 to 35 percent of the upper-level curric-
ulum.” Andrew F. Popper, The Uneasy Integration of Adjunct Teachers into American Legal Education, 47 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 83, 83 (1997). There is some indication that current expansion of experiential learning require-
ments has led to increased use of adjunct professors. James H. Backman & Cory S. Clements, Significant but 
Unheralded Growth of Large Externship Programs, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 145, 190 (2013) (“About half of the 
survey respondents indicated that their law schools have increased the number of adjunct faculty to help with the 
growth of externships.”). ABA standards do limit adjunct faculty to less than half the coursework students take. 
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCH. § 402 (2015-16) (“The full-time faculty 
shall also teach during the academic year either (1) more than half of all of the credit hours actually offered by 
the law school, or (2) two-thirds of the student contact hours generated by student enrollment at the law school.”). 
Recommendations” from the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education have included proposals to use 
even more adjunct faculty to lower costs and expose students to the practice of law. Peter A. Joy, Law Schools 
and the Legal Profession: A Way Forward, 47 AKRON L. REV. 177, 190 (2014) (citing Illinois State Bar Associ-
ation, Special Committee on the Impact of Law School Debt on the Delivery of Legal services, Final Report & 
Recommendations (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/commit-
tees/Law%20School%20Debt%20Report%20-%203-8-13.pdf). 
 98. Twenty-seven percent of all full-time clinical faculty nationally are on a traditional tenure track that apply 
unitary scholarship standards. Thirteen percent are on a clinical tenure track, a significant percentage of which 
require some form of regular scholarship production. Bryan L. Adamson, et al., Clinical Faculty in the Legal 
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that this scholarship is unlikely to effectively explore the questions of justice it argues 
should be central to legal education because these faculty “have no regular interaction with 
even doctrinal legal scholars, much less scholars from other disciplines in the university.”99 
Again, the question is the extent to which this observation holds true in the majority of law 
schools today. 
The chapter goes on to argue that this division between interdisciplinary theoretical 
scholar/classroom teachers and professionally-oriented clinical teachers undermines the 
centrality of justice and of promoting the legal profession and professional identity through 
teaching and scholarship. It argues for a unified academy, with justice as a centerpiece. 
Chapter four goes on to refute the legal education reform proposals offered by the Carnegie 
Report100 and by law professor Brian Tamanaha.101 The latter proposal, which would di-
vide law schools into two “tiers,” would dilute the value of both the practical and the the-
oretical forms of education these schools would provide, with no guarantees of lower costs 
for either. The book argues that the former “integrationist” approach suffers from a theo-
retical vacuum, having no conception of the law or lawyering.102 
The book then posits a concrete proposal built on a series of required courses con-
sisting of no more than three credit hours each: “the first year would then include four 
three-credit common law (and private law) courses of property, contract, civil procedure 
and tort, and four three-credit public law courses, including international law, criminal 
law, constitutional law, and an introduction to administrative and legislative processes.”103 
A heavily required second-year curriculum would include: 
 
a course (from a range of offerings) on justice, an interdisciplinary 
course (again from a range) focusing on either critique of law or the con-
text of law, a course on the legal profession, a course (from a range, with 
different substantive focuses) centered on administrative processes, a 
course (again, from a range) focused on legislative process, a course on 
corporate law, and a course on tax law.104 
 
Finally, the third year would be given over to courses focused on the student’s em-
ployment interests and skills oriented courses. 
It is unclear how dramatic a proposal this is. Of the roughly ninety hours necessary 
for graduation in most law schools, almost half of those hours are already in required 
courses.105 With the new accreditation standards requiring six credit hours of “experien-
tial” coursework, the required curriculum is growing. While many of the courses that the 
                                                 
Academy: Hiring, Promotion and Retention, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 127 (2012). 
 99. WEST, supra note 1, at 179. 
 100. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
 101. TAMANAHA, supra note 2. 
  102. WEST, supra note 1, at 21. 
 103. Id. at 189. 
 104. Id. at 191. 
 105. CARPENTER, supra note 82. The ABA Survey of curriculum reports that in 2010, the average units for 
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author suggests should become required are now electives, they are nonetheless popular 
electives, given the regularity of their appearance in law school curricula. Thus, ultimately, 
it is the author’s directive to give greater attention to theory in general and the theory of 
justice that marks the suggestions of Teaching Law. 
IV. LEGAL EDUCATION’S FUTURE 
While only Robin West’s book focuses exclusively on law schools, all have signifi-
cant observations about the future of legal education. All three books suggest that reform 
in legal education is necessary. All suggest the need for cost controls and transparency; 
the need to respond to changes in the future of legal practice; and the challenges of legal 
education’s identity as both a part of a university and a part of a profession.  All note the 
dramatic changes in the practice of law and legal education that have occurred in the past 
decade, with some varying views on the causes of these changes. Moliterno notes espe-
cially the effect of law firm and corporate client shifts of training costs for new associates 
back to the law schools, as the willingness to hire or pay for new law school graduates has 
declined dramatically as calls for graduating “practice ready” students have increased.106 
Rhode is especially cognizant of the social justice costs of these transformations in legal 
education and suggests that reforms should address in particular the unmet legal needs of 
the average client.107 West paints a picture of transformations that are rudderless efforts to 
respond to a current crisis without a core mission.   
The authors are uniformly discouraged by the response of law schools in resisting 
reform. Moliterno is cautiously heartened by the response of the ABA in responding to the 
crisis in legal education but he finds in legal education itself the same self-protectionism 
as the book describes of the profession at other times. Rhode agrees. As she elsewhere 
observes: “[a] fundamental problem in American legal education is a lack of consensus 
among faculty that there is a fundamental problem, or one that they have a responsibility 
to address. Law schools have a long and unbecoming history of resistance to reform.”108 
West argues that current proposals for reform do not address the central “existential crisis” 
                                                 
required for graduation was eighty-nine units and the median was eighty-eight units. Id. at 26. The largest number 
of reporting schools reported ninety credit hours. Id. at 26-27. Of these, the first year of law school typically 
takes thirty to thirty-two credit hours, all of which are required in the majority of law schools. Id. at 48. The 
American Bar Association requires three additional courses beyond the first year: Professional Responsibility, 
an upper-division writing experience, and a course providing “other professional skills.” Id. at 31. At an average 
of two credit hours each, this makes an addition six required credit hours. Id. Finally seventy-six percent of law 
schools have additional required courses beyond the first year, the most common being Constitutional Law (if 
not offered in the 1L year), Evidence, Advanced Legal Writing, and Business Organizations. Id. at 67. 
 106. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 195-96 (“An economic transfer has accompanied the desertion of a system 
in which mostly corporate clients willingly paid for the training of beginners at major law firms. Now, law firms 
are shifting the training cost to law schools by demanding that they undertake more practical preparation.”). 
 107. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 122 (“Tuition payments by poorer students sub-
sidize scholarships for richer ones.”) (citing Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, 
and Intrinsic Worth, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1979 (2011)). Professor Rhode suggests that “[t]hree years in law school 
and passage of a bar exam are neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee proficiency in many areas where 
needs are greatest, such as uncontested divorces, landlord–tenant matters, immigration, or bankruptcy. . . . The 
diversity in America’s legal demands argues for corresponding diversity in legal education.”  Id. at 128. 
 108. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 136-37 (citing Edward Rubin, The Future and 
Legal Education: Are Law Schools Failing and, If So, How?, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY. 499, 500 (2014); Robert 
W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 VAND. L. REV 339 (2007)). 
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of legal education and that “we run a quite real risk that these reforms, or others taken in 
response to changing market conditions and professional complaints, will actually make 
our deeper problems all the more intractable.”109 
Each provides some proposals for shifts in focus and curriculum changes. The books 
agree that experiential education serves multiple goals of preparing students for law prac-
tice, for leadership, and for meeting the demands of the profession.110 All would suggest 
using the third year to focus on experiential learning. All would include a broader range 
of learning outcomes than traditionally provided by law schools.  
Not surprisingly, the authors draw their lists of curricular additions and reforms in 
part from their own expertise and the perspective of their home institutions. All three teach 
at elite, private schools.  
Moliterno has spent decades teaching and directing programs in legal skills, clinical, 
and professional responsibility.111 His current law school (Washington and Lee) has be-
tween thirty-six and thirty-nine full-time faculty members and a near equal number of part-
time faculty who teach about four hundred students.112 His list of curriculum additions 
would include: problem-solving, business-sense, project management, collaboration, sta-
tistics, emotional needs of clients, and creativity.113  
Rhode’s expertise lies in professional responsibility and social justice.114 Stanford, 
where she teaches, is a large law school with between seventy-six to ninety full-time fac-
ulty teaching a total of 574 students.115 She emphasizes the teaching of values and ethics, 
of course, and like Moliterno, she also suggests that lawyers can learn from non-lawyers. 
The specific leadership skills she suggests that law schools should include in their curric-
ulum looks like a page from a business school curriculum: “problem solving, teamwork, 
influence, organizational dynamics, and conflict management.”116  
Robin West is a professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University Law 
Center, where she specializes in legal theory. Georgetown is massive compared to the 
other authors’ schools, with nearly two thousand students, a faculty of 124 full-time in-
structors, and 149-185 part-time faculty.117 Her proposal does not deny the value of an 
interdisciplinary perspective or of professional skills training, but would balance these 
                                                 
  109. WEST, supra note 1, at 23. 
 110. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 228-29; RHODE, supra note 1, at 97 (specifically endorsing “mentoring, 
problem-solving and role-playing”); WEST, supra note 1, at 156, 177. Not surprisingly, Professor Rhode has also 
developed teaching materials for leadership education. Rhode & Packel, Leadership, in LAW AND LEADERSHIP: 
INTEGRATING LEADERSHIP STUDIES INTO THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM (Paula Monopoli & Susan McCarty 
eds., 2013). 
 111. Washington & Lee Law School, James E. Moliterno, https://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/pro-
filedetail.asp?id=298. 
 112. ABA STANDARD 509 INFOR. REP. (2014) http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org (last visited Jan. 27, 
2016). 
 113. MOLITERNO, supra note 1, at 232-33. 
 114. Stanford University Law School, Deborah L. Rhode, https://law.stanford.edu/directory/deborah-l-rhode. 
 115. ABA STANDARD 509, supra note 112. 
 116. RHODE, supra note 1, at 29. 
 117. ABA STANDARD 509, supra note 112. 
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with courses that would expose students to a broader range of law and a deeper under-
standing of legal theory.118 
One is left hungry for the conversation that would ensure if all three authors were 
placed on a law school’s curricular reform taskforce.  Even more interesting would be the 
addition to that taskforce of faculty from public, regional law schools.   
An interesting addition to that conversation might come from the national conversa-
tion over outcomes and assessment of student learning.  What is missing from all three 
proposals to some extent is the method by which law schools could ensure that students 
would transfer knowledge across the authors’ suggested menus of skills, theory, and doc-
trine. Certainly methods of curricular reform that amount to “add X and stir” do not nec-
essarily translate into more learning. Harvard Education Professor David N. Perkins refers 
to the problem of dividing content from context as “aboutitis” creating “endless learning 
about something without ever getting better at doing it.”119 Students learn and retain 
knowledge best when theory, doctrine, and practice are combined.120 The teamwork and 
collaboration skills that Moliterno and Rhode emphasize are important not only for stu-
dents to learn, but for faculty as well.  For West’s suggestion that law schools “embrace 
pluralism,”121 faculty members must improve their own collaborative skills, as they will 
increasingly need to share their classrooms,122 clinics, and assessments to achieve the out-
comes students will need and demand.   
While all three authors express pessimism regarding law faculty and their ability or 
desire to change, the fact that the authors have invested the time and resources to produce 
well-researched, thoroughly documented, and passionate calls for reform is ultimately the 
most hopeful sign of all. 
 
 
                                                 
 118. WEST, supra note 1, at 191. 
 119. DAVID N. PERKINS, MAKING LEARNING WHOLE: HOW SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING CAN 
TRANSFORM EDUCATION 6 (2009). 
 120. Barbara Glesner Fines, Out of the Shadows: What Legal Research Instruction Reveals About Incorporat-
ing Skills throughout the Curriculum, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 159, 183 (2013) (discussing “the curse of coverage” 
in which “the ever-present drive for ‘coverage’ implicit in the growing size of course books and the press of the 
‘mile wide and inch thick’ bar examination lends advantage to the ‘breadth’ side of the equation in the battle 
between depth and breadth”). 
 121. WEST, supra note 1, at 208. 
 122. Rhode’s observations regarding the tendency toward competition in the lawyer personality, translates into 
a culture norm of competition within law schools as well, a norm that forward-looking law schools and faculty 
will need to adjust if improvements in pedagogy will be successful. Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and the 
Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879, 906 (1997). 
19
Fines: Three Views of the Academy: Legal Education and the Legal Profess
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
